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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction, having granted Petitioner's petition for
writ of certiorari. Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(a).
II. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews a decision by the Court of Appeals "for
correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference." Oak Lane Homeowners Assn. v.
Griffin, 2011 UT 25, f7. "The Supreme Court's review extends no further than to
determine whether the court of appeals accurately reviewed the trial court's decision
under the appropriate standard of review." State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 295 TJ15, 137 P.3d
787, quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wong, 2005 UT 51, ^[15, 122 P.3d 589.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Tom Watkins filed this action on July 1, 2005. Complaint, R.l. Watkins'
principal cause of action against Henry Day Ford was for breach of contract. Although
the Complaint included an alternative claim for specific performance, Watkins elected
prior to trial to seek damages.
2. Henry Day answered the Complaint on July 12, 2005. R.10.
3. This case was tried to the Bench on March 3, 2009. Minutes of Bench Trial
and record of exhibits offered and received, R. 564- 567.
4. Subsequent to trial, the Court asked the parties to submit memoranda regarding
a person's duty to speak on penalty that a person's silence might constitute waiver.
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V\dtkni', lesponsi. in lliv lonn i'l ,i Irilu i t omul at R.567A. Henry Day's response is
found at R.568.
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put the GT40 into production and that it would manufacture a limited number of the
vehicles. Watkins, Tr. 39: 13-16; Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12 (at Addendum "B"
hereto). Ford, at the time, did not indicate when the vehicles would be distributed to its
dealerships.
Tom Watkins, who owns a Volkswagen dealership, learned about the GT40 from
reading reports of the Detroit Auto Show in various trade publications to which he
subscribed. On learning of Ford's plan to put the GT40 concept car into production,
Watkins inquired at numerous Ford dealerships, initially without success, in an effort to
locate a dealer who might take his order for a GT40. Watkins, Tr. 41:18 - 43:14.
About March 2, 2002, Watkins met with Steve Kersey, Henry Day Ford's
Commercial Sales Manager. Watkins, Tr. 44:3; Kersey, Tr. 114:9-13. Watkins inquired if
Henry Day Ford might be allocated any Ford GT40s and, if yes, would it sell him one?
Watkins, Tr. 44:4-21. Kersey replied that Henry Day Ford might be allocated one,
perhaps two GT40s, although it was not certain it would be allocated any. Kersey
indicated that if Ford allocated and delivered to it any GT40s, it was willing to sell them
to Watkins. Watkins, Tr. 46:6-13.
Watkins knew that the concept car that Ford had introduced at Detroit still had to
be put into production, and anticipated that it might be several years before the GT40
would be available for sale to the public. Watkins, Tr. 40:13-18. As Ford had announced
it planned a limited production run, Watkins understood that not every Ford dealer would
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be allocated one or more Ford GT40s, and that Ford might not allocate any of the limited
production vehicles to Henry Day Ford. Watkins, Tr. 45:15-18. Kersey and Watkins
discussed that it might take two years or more before the GT40 would be delivered to
dealers. Watkins, Tr. 45:24-46:5; see also Finding of Fact no. 18 (R.631), finding that:
18. .. at the time the parties executed the Contracts, defendant was
uncertain as to when or if it would receive the GT 40's. Plaintiff
believed that at the time the Contracts were executed that it could
take as long as two years for defendant to receive the Ford GT 40's.

Watkins offered to purchase two Ford GT40s for manufacturer's suggested retail
price ("MSRP"), should Ford later allocate and deliver such vehicles to Henry Day.
Watkins also offered to pay Henry Day and it agreed to accept $1000 as a down payment
toward the purchase of each vehicle.
Henry Day prepared two written motor vehicle contracts of sale (the "Contracts")
dated March 4, 2002. Each identified the vehicle that was the subject of the Contracts, as
a new Ford GT40. One contract obligated Henry Ford to sell and Watkins to buy the "1 s t
GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford." The second obligated the parties to sell and buy the
"2nd GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford." The Contracts did not specify a model year for
the vehicle or a delivery date, because neither party could be sure when Ford would begin
delivery of the vehicles to its dealers. Each Contract specified a down payment in the
amount of $ 1,000. Watkins signed both Contracts, as did Kersey.
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Watkins, on March 4, 2002, gave Henry Day Ford a personal check for $2,000
which was the amount of the down payments on which the parties agreed. Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit 3. The next day the parties, consistent with their earlier discussion, amended their
Contracts to include the words "purchase for MSRP." Watkins, Tr. 49: 12-50:18; Kersey,
Tr. 112:19- 113:21; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 2. The Contracts did not, though, state a date
on which the contract price would be due.
Watkins, as of March 4, 2002, understood that Ford might not ever allocate any
GT40s to Henry Day, in which case it would have none to sell to him. Watkins, Tr. 51:2225. Henry Day cautioned Watkins that it might not be allocated any Ford GT40s, in which
case it would have none to sell to him. Kersey, Tr. I l l : 14-29. Kersey, though, believed
that it was possible that Henry Day might be allocated the vehicle that Ford had
announced as the GT40. Kersey, Tr. 111:14- 112:6. Watkins understood that if Ford
Motor Co. did not ever allocate any of the vehicles to Henry Day, then Henry Day would
have no duty to find for and sell to him a Ford GT40. Watkins, Tr. 52:1-3.
By letter dated December 31, 2002, Henry Day Ford advised Watkins that. "We
regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this
vehicle." Emphasis added; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4 and Addendum "A" hereto.
Enclosed with the letter was a check payable to Watkins in the amount of $2000. There
was no restrictive indorsement on the check. Believing Henry Day's representation that it

-5-

would not be receiving the vehicles identified by the Contracts, Watkins negotiated the
check. Watkins, Tr. 52:15-53:8.
Henry Day did not ask that Watkins release it of its contractual obligation, subject
to the condition precedent it and Watkins had identified. Watkins did not agree to release
Henry Day of its obligation, although he did believe based on Henry Day's representation
that it would not be receiving any Ford GT40s.
Having been told by Henry Day that it would not be receiving any of the vehicles
he had agreed to buy if Henry Day Ford was allocated any, Watkins renewed his search,
calling multiple Ford dealers in Utah and outside Utah. He found no one, however, who
was willing to sell himaGT40. Watkins, Tr. 53:13- 54:1.
Sometime between January 2002 and the Fall of 2004, when the model went into
production and deliveries began to dealers, Ford Motor Co. shortened the name of the
model it had introduced at Detroit as the GT40 to, simply, the "GT." See Henry Day's
Trial Exhibit 12, copy attached hereto at Addendum "B." Although now referred to as the
"GT," it was the same vehicle that Ford had introduced in early 2002 as the "GT40". Id.;
see also Kersey testimony, Tr. 112:14-18. The first production model delivered to
selected dealers, who included Henry Day Ford, was the 2005 Ford GT.
Henry Day's December 31, 2002 representation to Watkins that "our allocation is
not going to allow us to receive the vehicle" turned out not to be true. Ford Motor Co.
allocated the limited number of Ford GTs it produced to dealers who won certain awards.
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Even at the time Henry Day delivered its letter to Watkins, Henry Day knew that it was
possible that it could be allocated what was then still known as the GT40 if it won one of
the awards. Day, Tr. 148-149. Henry Day maintained at trial that it had thought it
unlikely that it would win any awards. Notwithstanding its professed pessimism, Henry
Day received the "Presidents Award," awarded by Ford for calendar years 2003 and 2004.
It also earned Ford's "Share of the Nation" award, based on its sales performance in
2003. As a consequence of Henry Day earning these multiple awards, Ford allocated and
delivered to Henry Day three Ford GTs.
Ford Motor Co. invoiced Henry Day for a white 2005 Ford GT Coupe about
December 9, 2004, which it later delivered to Henry Day. MSRP for the vehicle was set
by Ford at $156,595. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 12. According to Henry Day, it received
delivery of the white GT on May 31, 2005. Findings of Fact 31, 32. Henry Day did not
disclose to Watkins its allocation or receipt of the white GT coupe. Instead, Henry Day's
owner, Mike Day, kept it for his personal use.
Ford allocated to Henry Day a second Ford GT about May 31, 2005 - a red 2005
Ford GT Coupe. MSRP was set by Ford at $156,945. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 13. The
second GT was delivered to Henry Day during or after July, 2005. Findings of Fact 33,
34.
On June 8, 2005, one of Watkins' employees mentioned to Watkins that she had
heard that Henry Day had received two Ford GTs. Watkins, Tr. 54:18 - 55:4. Until then,
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Watkins did not know that Ford Motor Co. had allocated and delivered to Henry Day any
Ford GTs. Tr. 55:5-14. Watkins went immediately to Henry Day Ford, insisted that
Henry Day fulfill its obligations under the Contracts and sell him two Ford GTs for
MSRP. LI Watkins offered to write a check for the Ford GTs at MSRP. Henry Day
refused Watkins' tender and refused to sell him either of the two vehicles it had been
allocated, informing Watkins that their Contracts were no longer valid. Watkins, Tr. 56:
1-13. It did, though, offer to sell him the white Ford GT if Watkins would pay $250,000
instead of MSRP. Watkins, Tr. 58:2- 59:10; 100: 6-11.
Watkins filed this action soon after Henry Day rejected his tender of MSRP for the
two vehicles. Henry Day subsequently sold the red 2005 Ford GT to a car dealer in
Washington, for $206,000. Day, Tr. 130:20 - 131:22; 136:18-25. Only sometime after this
action was filed, and the market value of Ford GTs had dropped significantly, did Henry
Day offer to sell to Watkins the third GT it had received, for MSRP. Watkins declined the
offer and maintained his suit for breach of contract.
V. NATURE OF THE PARTIES9 CONTRACTS
The promise by Henry Day Ford to sell Watkins one, possibly two, Ford GT40s, or
"GT" as the vehicle was later called, was subject to a condition precedent: that being
Ford Motor Company's non-guaranteed future allocation to Henry Day of one or two
Ford GTs once the model went into production. A condition precedent "calls for the
performance of some act on the happening of some event after a contract is entered
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into and upon the performance or happening of which its obligations are made to
depend." Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah App. 1993)
(emphasis added); Associated Inv. Co. v. Cavias. 55 Utah 377, 185 P. 778, 779 (1919);
see also McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21, | 1 3 . "Whether a promise is
conditional depends upon the parties' intent, which is derived from a fair and
reasonable construction of the language used in light of all the circumstances when
the parties executed the contract." Commercial Union, 38 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the parties clearly intended the Contracts for the sale and
purchase of one or more Ford GTs to be subject to a condition precedent. Jeremy Day
told Steve Kersey to tell Watkins that it was not an SVT dealer and that it might not be
allocated any GT40s, but if it did it would sell them to Watkins. Watkins likewise
understood that Henry Day Ford might not be allocated any of Ford's newly announced
sports car, but if it did Watkins agreed to purchase up to two at MSRP.
This case is, in some respects, similar to Koenen v. Royal Buick Co., 162 Ariz.
376, 783 P.2d 822 (Ariz. App. 1989). Koenen involved a buyer's quest to purchase a
Buick GNX, a limited edition vehicle. The Buick GNX was the fastest limited production
car in the United States at the time, and Buick made only 500. Koenen approached Royal
Buick before the dealership knew if it would be allocated any GNX's and said he wanted
to buy one. Royal agreed to sell Koenen a GNX for MSRP, which Koenen agreed to pay.
The parties signed a purchase order. Royal took orders from three different people for
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GNX's. Later, Buick informed Royal it would be allocated one. In characterizing the
nature of the contract between Koenen and Royal, the court held that Royal's contractual
duty to sell Koenen a Buick GNX was subject to a condition precedent; that being
Buick's allocation to it of a GNX. Koenen, 183 P.2d 827 n.5. According to the Arizona
Court of Appeals:
Koenen suggests that the only question as to availability was whether
Royal Buick would receive a GNX automobile to sell to Koenen.
We agree that this is the only reasonable interpretation to be placed
upon this term contained in the purchase order. The receipt of the GNX
then becomes a condition to Royal Buick's duty to perform.
Koenen, 783 P. 2d 827 (emphasis added). The court of appeals agreed with the trial
court, which had "concluded that had Royal Buick not received a GNX, no breach of
contract would have occurred." Id., n.5. On receipt of a GNX and realization of the
condition precedent, though, Royal had a contractual obligation to sell to Koenen the
GNX it had been allocated, and which it received, for MSRP.
Performance of a duty, or promise to perform subject to a condition precedent
becomes due only if the condition occurs. Had Ford Motor Co. not ever allocated any
Ford GTs to Henry Day, it would have had no obligation to sell any to Watkins. Looking
beyond the "four corners" of the parties' Contracts, the trial court's findings of fact
recognized the conditional nature of the parties' agreement, finding that:
Though defendant did not have any GT 40's on its lot, nor did the
dealership know if it would be allocated any GT 40's to sell, at that
time Mr. Kersey was given permission to enter into a contract(s)
to sell plaintiff Ford GT40 automobiles, if such vehicles were allotted
-10-

to defendant.
Finding of Fact no. 8 ( R.630); see also Findings of Fact nos. 9 (R.630) (". . . defendant
would sell the plaintiff two (2) GT40 automobiles if defendant was allocated the
vehicles"); and 18 ( R.632) (finding that, "at the time the parties executed the contracts,
defendant was uncertain as to when or if it would receive the Ford GT40s . . .").
Henry Day's contractual obligation to sell to Watkins one or more Ford GTs came
into existence the moment Ford Motor Co. allocated to Henry Day the first Ford GT,
assuming (1) that that was the vehicle for which the parties had contracted and (2) that
Watkins had not waived his right to purchase it.
The conditional nature of Watkins5 and Henry Day's Contracts, in which the
obligation to sell and the obligation to buy up to two GT40's depended on Ford Motor
Company allocating one or more of the vehicles to Henry Day, bears especially on Henry
Day's defenses of waiver and abandonment.
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law and was correct holding that the
trial court was permitted to, and should have considered extrinsic evidence in determining
what the parties meant by their reference to "GT40" in the contracts they signed in March
2002, and in overruling the trial court's conclusions of law to the contrary. It was also
correct in holding that Ford Motor Company's change of name of the vehicle it had
introduced in early 2002 as the "GT40," to "GT", created a "latent ambiguity" that
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warranted the courts' consideration of extrinsic evidence - including Ford's renaming of
the vehicle- to determine what the parties meant by their reference to "GT40" in their
Contracts. Although the Contracts included an integration clause, the existence of an
integration clause does not preclude a court from considering extrinsic evidence in order
to determine if there exists a latent ambiguity, or what the parties meant by their use of
the words in the contract. The Court of Appeals was correct in determining that the GTs
that Henry Day received were the same vehicle and model that the parties had identified
in their contracts, the only difference being that Ford had changed the name of the model
from "GT40" to "GT."
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law and was correct in determining,
based on the evidence as marshaled, that the evidence clearly preponderated against the
trial court's findings that Watkins had abandoned or waived his contractual rights. It was
correct in concluding that Henry Day had failed to prove that Watkins, by his conduct,
had intentionally relinquished a contractual right that he understood and knew he still had
- especially given Henry Day's unequivocal statement by letter dated December 31, 2002
that Ford Motor Company would not be allocating to it any GT40s. Additionally, Henry
Day may not claim waiver where its false representation was the basis of the waiver. It
cannot claim waiver based on Watkins' alleged silence for 2 Vi years, where Watkins had
no right to demand Henry Day's performance until Ford Motor Co. allocated to it one or
more Ford GTs. The Court of Appeals' holding furthermore can be affirmed on the basis
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that Henry Day did not attempt to prove that it was prejudiced by Watkins' alleged waiver.
Given its construction of the parties' contracts and its conclusion that Watkins did
not by his conduct waive or abandon a contract right that was known to him to still exist,
the Court of Appeals correctly held that Henry Day breached its Contracts. It was
therefore correct to remand the case for a trial on damages, and a determination of
attorneys fees which Watkins is entitled to recover.
The record on failure to mitigate damages is incomplete, and in fact the trial court
did not reach the issue of damages. Its finding on failure to mitigate damages was
therefore premature. Its conclusion was also wrong, in that a party's failure to accept a
settlement offer cannot be the basis for failure to mitigate damages. The Court of Appeals
did not err, though, in remanding the issue for trial to develop a better record on the issue.
VII. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON CERTIORARI

A. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in its Interpretation of the Parties9
Contracts

Juliet says to Romeo in the famous Shakespearean play:
What's in a name?
That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet.
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What is in a name? That is the question.
On March 4, 2002, Tom Watkins and Henry Day Ford entered into two written
Contracts: one for the "first GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford;" another for the "second
GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford." Both Contracts identified the motor vehicle covered
by the Contracts to be a new Ford GT40, but did not identify the model year or vehicle
identification numbers.
Ford Motor Company had recently unveiled at the North American Auto Show in
Detroit a concept car that it, at the time, identified as the "GT40." Ford announced plans
to put the GT40 into production, to be delivered to its dealers hopefully in time for the
company's centennial. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 12 (Addendum B hereto).
Watkins testified at trial that the vehicle he had agreed to buy, when he signed the
Contracts, was "the car known at the time as the Ford GT40 and the car that Mr. Kersey
and I both described at the time as being the Ford GT40." Tr. 72:9-13. Watkins and
Kersey used the term "GT40" to identify the vehicle that was the subject of their
Contracts, "because that was its name at the time." Watkins, Tr. 47:9-13.
Sometime between March 4, 2002 and the start of Ford's distribution of the
vehicles to its dealers, Ford Motor Co. renamed the vehicle, "GT." See Henry Day
Ford's Trial Exhibit 12. Notwithstanding Henry Day's prior representation to Watkins
that Ford Motor Co. would not be allocating to it any GT40s, Ford Motor Co., in late
2004, allocated to Henry Day a white 2005 Ford GT Coupe, which it delivered to Henry
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Day on May 31, 2005. Ford Motor Co. allocated to Henry Day a second Ford GT Couple,
also a 2005 model, for which it invoiced Henry Day on May 31, 2005. Later, Ford
Motor Co. allocated and shipped to Henry Day a third GT, a 2006 Ford GT Coupe.
Henry Day knew and understood that the GTs it received were the same model that
Ford Motor Co. had initially introduced as the Ford GT40, as evidenced by the testimony
of its managers at trial. Steve Kersey testified that he understood the Ford GT was
the same vehicle that he, in preparing the Contracts, had identified as the Ford
GT40.
Q.

[by Watkins' attorney]: Now you understood that
the automobiles that were the subject of these
contracts was the yet to be produced Ford GT
concept car or the GT40 as it was called at that
time, correct?

A.

[Kersey]:

Yes.

Tr. 112:14-18. The Court of Appeals interpreted this admission as unequivocal testimony
that Kersey "shared Watkins' understanding regarding the model of the car being
discussed." Watkins, ]fl4. In addition, Jeremy Day, a co-owner and general manager of
Henry Day Ford,1 reluctantly conceded that the Ford GT was the same vehicle that Ford
Motor Company had initially introduced as the Ford GT40:

]

Tr. 122: 7-16
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Q.

[by Watkins' attorney]: As of the date of that letter,
December 312, you knew that dealers winning those
awards3 would qualify for cars.

A.

[Day]: What I knew is that's what our zone rep had
told me, yes. It was - it was - 1 would not receive a
GT 40, but if we won one of these two awards, we
could receive the GT.

Q.

The GT had earlier been introduced as the GT 40, had
it not?

A.

I'm not sure. I mean, I didn't - 1 didn't watch the trade
shows or whatnot. I believe so. I think evidence says
that it was, yes.

Tr.l26:25-127:9.
Notwithstanding Kersey's and Day's trial testimony that the GT40 and GT were
the same vehicle model, and notwithstanding the 2003 Ford Motor Company Bulletin
(Defendant's Exhibit 12) that describes the transition of the vehicle from "GT40" to
"GT,"4 Henry Day disingenuously argued at trial and to the Court of Appeals that it could
not have breached its Contracts with Watkins because Ford Motor Company did not ever
allocate and deliver to it a Ford GT40. The three vehicles it received, in recognition of
2

Question refers to Henry Day's letter to Tom Watkins dated December 31, 2002,
in which Henry Day informed Watkins that "our allocation is not going to allow us to
receive this vehicle." Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4.
3

The "President's Award" and the "Share of the Nation Award." Transcript,
124:14-125:15; 126:14-18. See also Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 7-9.
4

Defendant Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit 12 is a Ford Motor Company Bulletin
dated June 2003. The bulletin is entitled, "From Concept to Production: GT40 to
GT." Addendum B.
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the awards it won, it said, were "GTs," not "GT40s"; and it had no contractual obligation
to sell Watkins a "GT."
Henry Day vigorously argued at trial and on the appeal below for a strict
application of the parol evidence rule, contending that the trial court and the court of
appeals had to determine the meaning of "GT40," as used in the Contracts, solely by
reference to the words within the "four corners" of the Contracts. On appeal, it argued
that the two Contracts are "undisputedly clear and unambiguous and were intended to be
a final and complete expression of the parties' bargain." Appellee's Brief, 13. Neither
the trial court nor the Court of Appeals, Henry Day insisted, could consider any extrinsic
evidence - i.e., any evidence outside the language of the contract, to construe the meaning
of"GT40."
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was able to and should have
considered extrinsic evidence in construing the term "GT40" and that it erred when it
concluded, under the circumstances, (1) that it was "required to interpret the parties'
contracts" based upon the "plain meaning" of the words used in the Contracts; (2) that the
"GTs" allocated to Henry Day Ford were a model of vehicle other than that identified in
Watkins' and Henry Day's Contracts as a "GT40"; and (3) that Henry Day therefore did
not breach the Contracts. Having just quoted Kersey's testimony wherein he
acknowledged that the GT was the same vehicle that Ford had introduced as the GT40,
Tr. 126:25-127:9, Watkins. f 14, the Court of Appeals concluded:
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The evidence of the circumstances surrounding the contract
formation and the situation of the parties at the time of
contract formation does not indicate any other understanding
on the part of either party. And the understanding that the use
of the term GT40 referenced the newly-announced street-legal
version of the GT40 is certainly supported by the language of
the contracts. When the parties chose the term GT40, it was
unambiguous and meant just that - the parties were
contracting for the sale of what was then known as the GT40.
Thus, the use of the term GT40 does not render the contracts
facially ambiguous just because the car model ultimately
produced was named simply the GT.
Watkins, fl4.
Ford Motor Company's subsequent change of name from "GT40" to "GT,"
according to the Court of Appeals, created a "latent ambiguity" concerning the parties'
prior use of the term of "GT40" in their Contracts. According to the Court of Appeals, "a
latent ambiguity" is one that "does not readily appear in the language of a document, but
instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied or
executed." Watkins, ^[15. The Court of Appeals continued, "extrinsic evidence, parol or
otherwise, is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a writing" and that a "court may
receive evidence of such surrounding facts as will enable it to look upon the transaction
through the eyes of the parties thereto and thereby know what they understood or intended
the ambiguous word or provisions to mean." Watkins, f 15 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v.
Qgden Theatre Co., 82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 (1932). With the benefit of the
extrinsic evidence before it, the Court of Appeals held:
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We determine that there is a latent ambiguity in the contracts
at issue here, created by Ford's later decision to name the
anticipated car the GT instead of the GT40. We thus look to
the same evidence of surrounding circumstances as we did
above to determine what car the parties intended to buy and
sell. Again, it is clear that the parties meant the same thing
with their reference to the GT40. And thus, taking the
contract term GT40 to reference this car of a slightly different
name accomplishes the concordant intent that the parties had
when contracting, that is, it provides for the sale of two of the
cars that Ford announced and produced on the heels of the
GT40 concept car that was unveiled at the 2002 auto show.
Because Henry Day received three such cars and did not sell
two to Watkins for MSRP, Henry Day breached the contracts
- assuming they had not been abandoned and that Watkins
had not waived his rights thereunder.
Watkins416.
On certiorari, Henry Day again argues that any court interpreting the WatkinsHenry Day Ford contracts must construe what the parties meant by their use of the term
"GT40" by reference only to the language used in the Contracts, without resort to or
consideration of any extrinsic evidence presented to the trial court. Henry Day stridently
continues to argue that "GT40" is a clear and unambiguous term and that "GT40" does
not mean "GT." Henry Day also argues that the inclusion of an integration clause in the
Contracts bars reference to extrinsic evidence. As Henry Day did not receive delivery of
a "GT40," it contends it did not breach its Contracts with Watkins.
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Watkins responds as follows to Henry Day Ford's argument.
1. The meaning of words used in a contract, and whether the words used
are or are not ambiguous, cannot always be determined solely by reference to words
"within the four corners" of the contract.
Corbin, in his treatise on contracts, strongly criticizes the notion that the meaning
of all terms in a contract can be divined by looking only to language "within the four
corners" of a contract. According to Corbin:
Words and acts are merely symbols of expression. No person can
determine the meaning of written words merely by gluing his or her
eyes within the four corners of a square paper. It is human beings who
give meanings to words, and words in themselves have no meaning. When a
judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the
meaning of stated words is plain and clear, that decision is formed by and
wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of the judge's own
personal education and experience.
5 Corbin on Contracts, § 24.7 at 39 (1998) (emphasis added). The eminent jurist Oliver
Wendell Holmes expressed a similar sentiment, when he observed in the course of a 1917
case:
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color or content according to the
circumstances and time in which it is used.
Towne v. Eisner. 38 S.Ct. 158, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 62 L.Ed. 372 (1917).
The Oregon Supreme Court, in a 1932 case, observed that:
The flexibility of or multiplicity in the meaning of words is the principal
source of difficulty in the interpretation of language. Words are the conduits
by which thoughts are communicated, yet scarcely any of them have such a
fixed and single meaning that they are incapable of denoting more than one
thought... it is said that a court in construing the language of the parties
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must put itself into the shoes of the parties. That alone would not suffice; it
must also adopt their vernacular.
Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co.. 141 Ore. 306, 16 P.2d 627 (1932).
2. Utah has adopted Corbin's reasoning and has rejected a strict application
of the parol evidence rule and related rules of contract construction.
The Utah Supreme Court in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assn., 907 P.2d 264
(Utah 1995), embraced Corbin's reasoning when it held that:
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, a determination of ambiguity is
inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the "extrinsic evidence of
the judge's own linguistic education and experience."
Ward, 268 (emphasis added) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Drayage &
Rigging Co.. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 643, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Cal. 1968) (quoting
Corbin § 579, at 225 n.5 (Supp. 1964)). According to the Utah Supreme Court in Ward,
"Rational interpretation of [contract terms] requires at least a preliminary consideration of
all credible evidence to prove the intention of the parties . . . so that the court can place
itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of
contracting." Ward, 268, quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 645. In embracing
Corbin's reasoning, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that, "While there is Utah
case law that espouses a stricter application of the rule and would restrict determination
of whether ambiguity exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of the terms of the
writing itself, the better reasoned approach is to consider the writing in light of the
surrounding circumstances." Ward, 268 (emphasis added).
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Subsequent Utah cases, or at least one line of Utah cases, acknowledge the holding
in Ward as the "better reasoned approach." These cases hold that the determination of
whether terms in a contract are or are not ambiguous, is not, as Henry Day contends on
appeal, restricted or limited to an examination of only those terms and words within the
four corners of a written document. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, 48 P.3d
918, 919; Nielson v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600, 601; Gillmor v. Macev, 2005
UT App 351,ffl[34,35, 121 P.3d 57; cert, denied, 126 P.3d 772 (Utah 2005); The
Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321,fflf26-29, 142 P.3d 140; Daines v.
Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269. According to Peterson, "In determining whether a
contract is ambiguous, the court is not bound to consider only the language of the
contract." 48 P.3d 918, 919. In Gillmor, the Utah Court of Appeals observed that:
Utah case law has rejected the strict application of the 'four corners5 rule,
which limits the boundaries of inquiry into whether an ambiguity exists in a
contract to the contract's "four corners" and effectively excludes evidence
of any surrounding circumstances - - outside the writing - - that might
indicate that the contract language lacks the required degree of clarity.
* * *

Likewise, Utah no longer strictly applies the "parol evidence rule" or the
"plain meaning rule," which exclude the use of any parol evidence to show
whether a contract's language lacks the required degree of clarity.
* * *

Instead, Utah law has made these rules of interpretation just part of the
initial inquiry to determine whether an ambiguity exists in contract
language. They are no longer the determinative rules they once were . . .
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Gillmor, ^35 n.14 (citations omitted); see also Cantamar, ^26 n.5.
The Court of Appeals, in Gillmor, acknowledged that line of Utah cases which
hold that "if the language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous," that
courts "'first look to the four comers of the agreement to determine the intentions of the
parties .. .' from the plain meaning of the contractual language." Gillmor, %34 (quoting
from Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, Tfl2, 40 P.3d 599).
Notwithstanding the pronouncements in similar such cases, the Utah Court of Appeals, in
Gillmor, consistent with Ward and Dames, stated that:
However, Utah law does not strictly require courts to only view the terms of
a contract within its four corners, according to their plain meaning, when
making a determination of whether there is an ambiguity in a contract.
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the plain language of the contract,
within its four comers, reveals no patently obvious ambiguities, the inquiry
into whether an ambiguity exists in a contract does not always end there.
Utah's rules of contract interpretation allow courts to consider any relevant
evidence to determine whether a latent ambiguity exists in contract terms
that otherwise appear to be unambiguous.
Gillmor, U1P4, 35 (emphasis in original). According to Ward, "when determining whether
a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." Ward, 907 P.2d at
268 (emphasis added). A proffered interpretation of a contractual term, by reference to
extrinsic evidence, must nonetheless be "tenable." Gillmor, p 7 n. 15. According to
Daines, it "must be plausible and reasonable in light of the language used." Daines, f31.
Even terms which purport to identify the subject matter of the contract may be
ambiguous. In such cases, courts in Utah have permitted the consideration of extrinsic
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evidence outside the "four corners of the contract" in order to determine the meaning of
such terms. See e.g.. Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Board, 2008 UT 3,
^13-16, 178 P.3d 886 (resort to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intended
meaning of the term "surplus property"); Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 29 (resort to
extrinsic evidence to determine what was meant by reference in a divorce decree to
husband's "IBEW pension," in which wife was given a half interest).
The Gillmor case provides a good example of where language in a contract,
seemingly unambiguous on its face, was, when considered within the context of the
parties' agreement at the time they made it and under the circumstances at the time,
determined to be ambiguous. At issue in Gillmor was a written easement, in which the
owners of one piece of property had previously bargained for the right to use their
neighbor's property to access their own. The easement, however, provided that, "Gillmor
agrees that he will not allow the use of and will not himself use any three-wheeled
motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized 'dirt bikes'
on the Easements at anytime." Gillmor, ]f4. Approximately 15 years later, the Maceys,
who had purchased part of the servient estate, stopped a Gillmor descendant who was
crossing their property while riding a four-wheeled ATV, and told him he could not do so.
A civil action ensued in which the trial court was asked to determine if the reference in
the easement to "three-wheeled motorized ATV vehicles," "two-wheeled motorcycles,"
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and "motorized dirt bikes" meant that the Gillmors and their guests could not cross the
Maceys' property on four-wheeled ATVs.
The Gillmors' argument to the trial court was much like that that Henry Day Ford
makes in this case: 4 wheels is not 3 wheels. The language used in the easement was
clear, said the Gillmors, in that it expressly prohibited them from crossing their
neighbor's property on three-wheeled ATV's, two-wheeled motorcycles, and twowheeled dirt bikes. But it did not prohibit them from crossing on four-wheeled AT Vs.
The restrictions, argued the Gillmors, were clear on their face and not ambiguous; and the
easement clearly did not proscribe the Gillmors' use of ATVs with four or more wheels.
Id., Tfl2, 32-33. The Court of Appeals conceded,
Admittedly, when viewed in isolation, the Agreement's plain language
would seem to lead to the conclusion that the terms "two-wheeled
motorcycles or motorized 'dirt bikes'" and "three-wheeled motorized All
Terrain Vehicles" are not at all ambiguous. On its face, the Agreement
appears only to limit the use of "two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized
'dirt bikes'" and "three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles" on the
easements; it says nothing of four-wheeled ATVs."
Gillmor, f34. The Court of Appeals explained, "nonetheless, by considering evidence of
the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Agreement in 1985 [which it concluded
was proper], it becomes clear that the Agreement is ambiguous as concerns the use of
four-wheeled ATVs on the easements." Id, 1(36. The trial court and Court of Appeals
noted that in 1985 four-wheeled ATVs were new and novel, and the court record
indicated that the parties who negotiated the conditions attached to the use of the
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easements, were at the time not aware that four-wheeled ATVs existed. The trial court
furthermore received and considered evidence that the Maceys5 predecessor had sought to
prohibit the Gillmors5 use of motorcycles, dirt bikes, and three-wheeled ATVs out of a
concern regarding the noise and dust they caused. Id, f37. The Court of Appeals agreed
that the Maceys' argument that the language in the easement barred the use of fourwheeled ATVs was tenable, plausible and consistent with the terms used in the easement;
as was the Gillmors' interpretation, which they based on the "plain meaning55 of the words
used in the easement. The Court of Appeals, in the end, affirmed the decision of the trial
court which had, first, based on extrinsic evidence, determined that the terms used in the
easement, while seemingly unambiguous on their face, were in fact ambiguous; and
second, had determined that the parties had by their use of the pertinent language intended
to proscribe the use of a class of vehicles including motorcycles, dirt bikes, and threewheeled ATVs that, without reference to the exact number of wheels they had, were noisy
and stirred up dust. Id., ^[37-42. Accordingly, the trial court held, based on its
consideration of extrinsic evidence to help it determine the parties5 intentions, that the
easement barred the Gillmors from crossing the Macey property on four-wheeled ATVs.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The fact that Ford sometime between early 2002 and late 2004 shortened the
designation of the vehicle that Watkins contracted to buy, from "GT4055 to "GT,55 does not
mean that the "GT,55 as the model had now come to be known, was a model other than
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and distinct from the vehicle/model that Henry Day Ford had agreed to sell to Watkins.
See Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12, at Addendum "A" hereto. The name change of the
model from "GT40" to "GT" does not and did not negate Henry Day Ford's contractual
obligation to Watkins.
Assume, hypothetically, that two thoroughbred horse breeders, A and B, agree, in
writing, that A will buy from B, for $100,000, a two year old stallion named Alpha, if B
should be able to aquire Alpha from C anytime within the next three years. C changes
Alpha's name to Beta, re-registers the stallion as "Beta," then, within two years of the
date of A's and B's contract, sells "Beta" to B. Can B then refuse to sell "Beta" to A on
the ground that their contract obligated B to sell the horse to A only if he, with three years
after their contract, was able to acquire a stallion named "Alpha"? Watkins presumes this
court would agree that B's obligation to sell the stallion now named Beta would remain,
and that B could not refuse to sell the horse to A on A's tender to B of $100,000. The
argument that Henry Day Ford makes, and the distinction it tries to draw between "GT40"
and "GT" is no different. "GT40" and "GT," like "Alpha" and "Beta," is the same horse.
In the context of the Alpha/Beta hypothetical, however, the parties' written
contract, if interpreted in accordance with reference to only the words contained within
the "four corners" of the contract, would appear to be unambiguous: the parties'
agreement concerned the conditional future sale and purchase of a horse named "Alpha";
and as "Beta" is not "Alpha" then "obviously" B would have no obligation to sell "Beta"
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to A. Only by considering extrinsic evidence of what A and B meant by their reference to
"Alpha," could the parties' intent and the subject matter of their agreement be correctly
determined. The hypothetical reveals the peril in attempting to discern the ambiguity or
meaning of words in a contract solely by reference to words with the four corners of the
contract.
3. The Court of Appeals did not err in its explanation and application of
latent ambiguity to the facts of this case.
Watkins, admittedly, approached the issue of contract interpretation in a slightly
different manner than did the Court of Appeals. Watkins, on appeal, argued that
extrinsic evidence was admissible to show that the parties, by their use of the term
"GT40" in their Contracts, meant the concept car that Ford had just introduced as the
"GT40" at the Detroit auto show, and had announced it planned to put it into production.
In Watkins' view, "GT40" was more than just "a name," but was and referred the vehicle
that Ford said it was going to put into production and make available for sale to the public
sometime in the next several years.
In the Court of Appeal's view, "When the parties chose the term GT40, it was
unambiguous and meant just that - the parties were contracting for the sale of what was
then known as the GT40." Watkins, f 14. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
ambiguity concerning the meaning of "GT40" developed later, and was caused by "Ford's
later decision to name the anticipated car the GT instead of the GT40." Watkins, ^}16.
Ford's renaming of the vehicle, see Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12, created a latent
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ambiguity that warranted resort to extrinsic evidence when Watkins, in 2005, demanded
performance, in order to determine what the parties had meant by their reference to
"GT40" in their Contracts. Watkins.ffl[15,16.
Judge Posner, in Knutson v. UGS Corp.. 526 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir., 2008),
explained the difference between "patent" and "latent" ambiguity as follows:
As explained by Francis Bacon more than 400 years ago, an
ambiguity is "patent" when it is recognized as an ambiguity
just by reading the documents; it is latent when it is not
recognized as an ambiguity until you know something outside
the contract. Bacon, A Collection of Some Principal Rules
and Maximes of the Common Law 90-91 (1597); Rossetto v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2000); Texas
v. American Tobacco Co., 463 F.3d 399, 409 (5th Cir. 2006);
Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d
1416, 1424 (3d Cir. 1994); 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:40
(2007 Supp., 4th ed., Richard A. Lord ed.). A contract that
provides for shipping cotton on the ship Peerless is not
ambiguous on its face, but there is a latent ambiguity if there
is more than one ship by that name to which the contract
might (if all you know is what the contract says) refer. Raffles
v. Wickelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
A latent ambiguity thus presupposes that extrinsic evidence
has been introduced - you need such evidence to establish the
ambiguity. A patent ambiguity leaps out at the reader from
the contract, and requires recourse to extrinsic evidence to
dispel. University of Southern Indiana Foundation v. Baker,
843 N.E.2d 528, 532-33 (Ind. 2006); Rossetto v. Pabst
Brewing Co., supra, 217 F.3d at 543.
Had Ford sometime between March 2002 and June 2005 not shortened the name of
the GT40 to "GT," and had delivered to Henry Day Ford three GT40s, there would have
been no ambiguity to resolve. The ambiguity arose when Ford changed the vehicle's
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name. The change of name was a collateral matter about which a court, charged with
determining what the parties meant by their reference to GT40 in March 2002, should
know and consider. That the change of name occurred after March 2002 supports the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the ambiguity was "latent." Given the latent
ambiguity, the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence in construing what
the parties meant by their reference to GT40 in March 2002, as did the Court of Appeals.
4. The Inclusion in the Contracts of an Integration Clause does not bar
consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning that the parties ascribed to
the term "GT40."
Henry Day argued to the trial court, to the Court of Appeals, and argues again on
certiorari that "an integrated agreement must be interpreted on its face . . . . " Petitioner's
Brief, 39. Henry Day construes an integration clause as barring resort to extrinsic
evidence to assist in the interpretation of terms used in the agreement.
An integration clause restricts a party's ability to argue that its agreement includes
additional terms not mentioned in a written agreement. The presence in a contract of an
integration clause, however, does not preclude a court from considering extrinsic or parol
evidence in order to interpret and determine the meaning of words and terms that are used
in contract. See Hessler v. Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 338 111. App 3d 1010,
788 N.E. 2d 405, 413 (2003). According to Corbin:
Even if a written document has been assented to as the complete and
accurate integration of the terms of a contract, it must still be interpreted;
and all those factors that are of assistance in this process may be proved by
oral testimony.
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6 Corbin on Contracts, § 579 (1979). Cantamar involved a promissory note/contract that
the trial court concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, was an "integrated"
agreement. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals took on the task of reviewing the trial
court's interpretation of terms used in the integrated agreement, holding that "[w]hen
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered."
Cantamar, ]f26 (quoting Ward, 907 P.2d at 268) (emphasis in original).
B. The Court of Appeals did not Err in Concluding that Watkins did not
Waive or Abandon his Rights Under his Contracts with Henry Day Ford,
1. "Waiver" and "Abandonment" at least as applied to contracts, are
substantially the same affirmative defense.
For the first time in this case, at trial or on appeal, Henry Day treats waiver and
abandonment as if they are separate and distinct legal constructs. Compare and contrast
Petitioner's Brief on certiorari, 11-27, to Appellee's Brief, 35-40; see also Defendant's
Trial Brief.
As concerns contract rights, it is not clear what is the difference between "waiver"
of a contract right and "abandonment" of a contract right, if there is any difference at all.
Early Utah cases, in fact, used the term "abandonment" to define "waiver." See e.g.,
O'Donnell v. Parker. 48 Utah 578, 160 P. 1192, 1194 (1916)(held, "A waiver is the
intentional abandonment of a known right"); WooUey v. Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 P. 908,
912 (1920) ("waiver is the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a
right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such
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person forever be deprived of its benefit"); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall 61 Utah
223, 211 P. 991, 993 (1922) ("waiver is defined as the voluntary abandonment of some
known right or advantage"). More recent Utah cases, including Soter's, the seminal Utah
case on "waiver," define "waiver" as the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n.. 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)
(emphasis added). "To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Id.5 "The
intent to relinquish a right must be distinct/9 Id. (emphasis added).
At least two pre- Soter?s cases analyze the relinquishment or "giving up" of
contract rights under the construct of "abandonment" without, though, distinguishing
between "abandonment" and "waiver." Both cases, though, define "abandonment" in
terms similar to how the Supreme Court in Soter's defined "waiver." See Timpanogos
Highlands. Inc. v. Harper. 544 P.2d 481 (Utah 1975); Forsyth v. Pendleton. 617 P.2d 358
(Utah 1980). Both decisions define "abandonment" to mean "the intentional
relinquishment" of one's rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such rights, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment." Timpanogos. 484;
Forsyth. 362 (emphasis added). In Forsyth, the Supreme Court added, "while the intent
must be clear and unequivocal, that intention . . . may be inferred from the acts and

5

The quotation attributed to Soter's by Petitioner at page 18 of its Brief is
incorrect. Perhaps the standard required to prove "abandonment," though, should be
exactly the same as for "waiver."
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conduct of the purchaser, which are clearly inconsistent with an intention to continue the
use of the property." Forsyth, 361 (emphasis added).
Both lines of cases, thus, speak to an "intentional relinquishment" of a contract
right. Both incorporate and state similarly rigorous requirements for proving a waiver or
abandonment of a contract right.
The burden to prove "abandonment" of a contract does not involve a substantially
different or less rigorous standard of proof than does "waiver," as Henry Day Ford seems
to imply in its present Brief - by presenting and arguing "abandonment" and "waiver" as
separate and distinct affirmative defenses.
2. The Court of Appeals correctly identified and applied Utah law on
Waiver and Abandonment.
The Court of Appeals correctly identified the applicable law in concluding that,
"There is simply no intentional relinquishment of a known right in this case." Watkins,
TJ17 (emphasis in original):
The trial court determined that Watkins had abandoned the contracts
and waived his rights thereunder by his acceptance of Henry Day's
return of the deposit. Waiver and abandonment involve the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. See Soter 's Inc. v.
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P. 2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)
("A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To
constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it. We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right
must be distinct." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P. 2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) ("Abandonment means the intentional relinquishment of
one's rights in the contract" and in order to nullify such rights, there
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must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment").
There is simply no intentional relinquishment of a known right in this
case.
Watkms, ^[17. Although the Court of Appeals cited one of its own cases as governing
authority on "abandonment," Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App
1988), Lucky Seven adopted and quoted verbatim the definition of "abandonment" of
contract rights articulated by the Supreme Court in Timpanogos, at 484. Henry Day Ford,
in its current Brief, does not contend that the Court of Appeals identified and applied the
wrong law. Nor does it argue that Soter's, or Timpanogos and Lucky Seven should be
overturned or modified.
The Court of Appeals furthermore correctly recognized that both "waiver" and
"abandonment" involve mixed questions of law and fact. Accordingly, it correctly noted
that the applicable standards of review required it to give the trial court's factual
determinations deference, and that it should not reverse the trial court's conclusions on
abandonment and waiver unless persuaded by Watkins that "the evidence clearly
preponderates against the [trial court's] findings":
"Where there is dispute as to whether [abandonment] has occurred,
it is usually a question of fact, to be determined from the
circumstances of the particular case . . ." Timpanogos Highlands
Inc. v. Harper, 544 P. 2d 481, 484 (Utah 1975)(footnote omitted).
Thus, "we do not reverse unless we are persuaded that the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings." Id. Likewise, "the
actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature
and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give
a district court deference." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, P 16,
982 P.2d 572.
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Watkins, ^[10. Where a trial court's conclusion of law involves a mixed question of law
and fact, an appellant must "first marshal all evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,
^76, 100 P.3d 1177. Watkins, in his Brief to the Court of Appeals, acknowledged his
duty to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact, Appellant's
Brief, 33, and did so, kL, 33-36. Henry Day does not contend in its current Brief that
Watkins failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings.
On the basis of the evidence as marshaled by Watkins on appeal, and according
deference to the trial court's findings, the Court of Appeals concluded that, "there is
simply no intentional relinquishment of a known right in this case." Watkins, ^[17. In
coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals implicitly was persuaded that the
evidence, as marshaled, "clearly preponderates against the findings." Id.
3. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the evidence did not
establish "an intentional relinquishment of a known [contractual] right," especially given
that Watkins' right to purchase the GT40s/GTs was subject to a condition precedent, and
given Henry Day Ford's representation to Watkins by letter dated December 31, 2002.
"Waiver" and "abandonment" both are affirmative defenses. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c).
Having raised "waiver" and "abandonment" as defenses, it was Henry Day Ford's
burden at trial to prove the defenses. McCornick v. Sadler, 11 Utah 444, 40 P. 711, 712
(Utah 1895).
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As Soter's held, "a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right."
Soter's, 942. "To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Id.
(emphasis added). "We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be
distinct." Id. " A distinct intent to waive must... be shown by a preponderence of the
evidence." Soter's, 942 n.6.6
According to American Jurisprudence (Am.Jur.2d):
Waiver is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must
generally be shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person

6

Proof of waiver, under the standard established by Soter's, requires that the party
which contends another party has waived his rights, must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the conduct of the other manifested a distinct intent - not just an intent
- to waive his rights. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Soter's,
We recognize that there is an inherent contradiction
between requiring "distinct" intent while permitting it to
be established by a preponderance only. It might make the
matter clearer if the burden of persuasion on intent were
"clear and convincing," as some jurisdictions require for
waiver or estoppel, see, e.g.,[citations omitted] (estoppel), and
the "distinct" requirement were dropped. We have no
occasion, however, to consider that matter today.
Soter's, 942 n.6 (emphasis added). Watkins submits that the better rule of proof
necessary to prove waiver would be proof by clear and convincing evidence. At the very
least, a "clear and convincing" standard that would be easier to comprehend and explain.
The Court of Appeals, though, did not err in applying the "distinct intent" proof
requirement articulated by Soter's, in concluding that the evidence at trial did not prove
Watkins' intention to relinquish a known right.
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against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the existence of the party's rights or of all material
facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of
a material fact negates wavier, and waiver cannot be established by a
. . . misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that
person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon
which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a knowledge
of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences.
28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §202 (2000).
A waiver of a known right "must be distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied." Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Utah 1978). Although an intent to
waive rights may be implied, the "general principle in our case law [is] that '[m]ere
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak.'" Id., 940;
Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998). "Although [an intent to relinquish a
right] may be express or implied [Soters at 941], it 'will not be implied from doubtful
acts.'" Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 2003 UT 51, ^84, 82 P.3d 1076 (quoting 28 Am.Jur.2d
Estoppel and Waiver §160 at 845 (1966)). "When waiver is to be implied from conduct,
the acts, conduct, or circumstances relied upon to show waiver must make out a clear
case." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §290 at 706 ( 2008). "Waiver will not be inferred
from slight circumstances or on slight proof, and is not to be lightly inferred in the face of
a clearly expressed intention to insist on the right alleged to have been waived." Id. at
705. Similarly, "abandonment," to the extent that it is a legal construct distinguishable
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from "waiver," means the intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and in
order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such an
abandonment." Timpanogos, 484.
Henry Day Ford's argument on certiorari is that the evidence at trial proved that
Watkins distinctly intended to relinquish his contractual right to purchase up to two Ford
GT40s (or "GTs" as they were later called) should Ford Motor Company allocate to
Henry Day at a future date at least one GT40/GT. It repeats the argument it made to the
Court of Appeals. Its argument seems to be based on two grounds: (1) that Watkins'
negotiation without protest of Henry Day's check for $2000, and (2) that Watkins' silence
over the next 2 !4 years (until he demanded that Henry Day Ford sell him the Ford GT it
had recently been allocated)7 "distinctly" or "unequivocally" revealed Watkins' intention
to relinquish his contract rights.
The principal event on which Henry Day bases its claim of waiver, as implied by
Watkins' conduct, is Watkins' act of cashing the check for $2,000 that Henry Day mailed
to him on December 31, 2002. What Henry Day wants to gloss over, or bury entirely, is
the misleading and untrue statement in its letter that accompanied the check, in which it
said:
We regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to
allow us to receive this vehicle.

7

A 2005 white Ford GT coupe which Henry Day Ford's owner, Mike Ford, kept
for his own use.
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This statement, according to the Court of Appeals:
. . .was an unequivocal representation by Henry Day that its prior
uncertainty regarding allocation had been resolved and that it now knew it
would not be receiving any of the subject cars. Had this representation
been true, then the parties would have known that a condition precedent to
the contracts was definitely not going to happen and they therefore would
no longer have had any rights or obligations under the contracts. See
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 1999 UT 34, P14, 976, P.2d 1213
("Under well-established principles of contract interpretation, where the
duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon the occurrence or
existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not require performance
by the obligor, because the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's
right to demand performance, does not arise until that condition occurs or
exists. Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any
duty to perform." (citation omitted)).
Watkins, fl8 (emphasis in original). By informing Watkins that it would not be
allocated and would not receive any such vehicles, Henry Day in effect advised Watkins
that the condition precedent, on which their mutual obligations were based, would not
occur. Watkins had no reason, given the certainty of Henry Day's statement, to believe
that Ford might nonetheless allocate one or more GT40s (to which Henry Day referred to
as "this vehicle") to Henry Day; and, thus, that he retained an unextinguished right to buy
a Ford GT40/GT from Henry Day at a future date. As the Court of Appeals concluded,
"There is simply no evidence whatsoever indicating that Watkins knew he still had rights
under the Contracts at the time he negotiated the check concerning his deposit."
Watkins, ^[18. On certiorari, Henry Day argues that this is not true, that other Ford
dealers had told Watkins, when he talked to them, that allocations were uncertain and
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might be tied to awards issued by Ford Motor Co. Petitioner's Brief, 20. This, though,
confirms Watkins' and Henry Day's initial understanding, when the Contracts were
signed, that an allocation to Henry Day was not assured. Watkins Tr. 45:15-18; see also
Findings of Fact, 8, 9, 18. In its letter dated December 31, 2002, however, Henry Day
unequivocally informed Watkins that, "our allocation is not going to allow us to receive
this vehicle."
Henry Day faults Watkins because he, having received its letter and its check,
negotiated its check "without objection or inquiry about the status of the President's
Award."

Petitioner's Brief, 20. But what reason did Watkins have to object or

complain if Ford Motor Company, whatever its basis or reason, had determined not to
allocate any GT40s (or GTs) to Henry Day? The only reason Watkins would have had to
inquire about the President's Award and Henry Day's probability of earning it, would be
if he disbelieved Henry Day's assurance that it would not be allocated "this vehicle." As
the Court of Appeals stated, "We . . . can conceive of no policy reason requiring Watkins
to distrust Henry Day's representation." Watkins, ^fl9. It could similarly conceive of no
reason why Watkins had a duty to object or protest, given the information transmitted by
Henry Day's December 31, 2002 letter. Id- The Court of Appeals held:
There was nothing that would have given Watkins any reason
to doubt the accuracy or truth of the information relayed by
Henry Day. And the crucial information regarding
nonoccurrence of the condition precedent is something that
Watkins had no way of independently verifying. Under these
circumstances, there was simply no relinquishment by
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Watkins of a known right, and we reverse the trial court on
this issue.

Watkins, ^|19, Henry Day, on certiorari, protests that the Court of Appeal's conclusion is
not correct, that "as noted, Watkins, an experienced car dealer, had the means to
independently verify the information in the letter which accompanied the return of his
deposit." Petitioner's Brief at 16. But how? By what means? Watkins is not a Ford
dealer, as such, he would have no means to check on Ford Motor Company's internal
plans to allocate limited production vehicles to its dealers.
Henry Day, on certiorari, also argues that Watkins' silence between December 31,
2002 and June 2005 proves that he intentionally waived or abandoned his known right to
purchase a GT for MSRP. However, the date for performance under the Contracts was
not the date of the Contracts; but was the date on which Henry Day ordered its first GT which it could order only if Ford Motor Co. allocated to it one or more GTs. Watkins
thus had no right demand performance by Henry Day until maybe December 2004, which
is when Ford Motor Co. invoiced Henry Day for a 2005 Ford GT Coupe, which Henry
Day Ford testified at trial was not delivered to it until May 31, 2005.8 See Finding of
Fact No. 32. "[A] person cannot waive a right before he or she is in a position to assert
it." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §201 (2000). On discovering that Ford had in fact

8

Watkins' right may have accrued at an earlier date, if Henry Day placed its order
for a GT earlier than December 2004.
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allocated and delivered to Henry Day a GT, notwithstanding Henry Day's statement in its
earlier letter dated December 31, 2002, Watkins immediately presented himself at Henry
Day Ford, and demanded it sell to him the GT it had received. Watkins did not sit on his
rights once he learned Henry Day had been allocated and had received a GT. He acted
and demanded performance immediately once he learned that the condition precedent on
which his rights depended had occurred. Neither abandonment nor waiver, thus, can be
inferred by Watkins' alleged "delay" in demanding that Henry Day sell him a Ford GT.
The Court of Appeals was therefore correct in overruling the trial court's Finding of Fact
No. 41.
Troubling to Watkins is Henry Day's continuing assertion that "Watkins, as an
experienced automobile dealer, knew his rights under the Contracts, and clearly
demonstrated his intention to relinquish those rights when he negotiated the $2,000.00
check." Petitioner's Brief at 26. This is a nice-sounding, but general and substantively
meaningless statement. What "rights" did Watkins know he had? Did he have special
rights known to him, solely because he is an owner of a motor vehicle dealership? What
rights," allegedly known to Watkins, did he, as an "experienced automobile dealer,"
knowingly relinquish? What special knowledge did he have, as an experienced dealer,
that demonstrated his distinct intention to relinquish [his] rights when he negotiated
Henry Day's check? Why would Watkins' negotiation of the check evidence a waiver of
his rights, given Henry Day's advice that "its allocation [was] not going to allow [it] to
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receive this vehicle?" Why is it that Watkins, who is not a Ford dealer, should have
known better than to believe Henry Day's statement that Ford Motor Co. was not going to
allocate it to any Ford GT40s? These are questions for which Watkins, at least, does not
know the answers.
A distinct intention by Watkins to waive a known legal right cannot be inferred
based on his act of cashing Henry Day's check and his silence over the next 2 lA years.
Although a waiver can be implied from a party's conduct, "it will not be implied from
doubtful acts." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. 2003 UT 51, |84, 82 P.3d 1076. "When waiver
is to be implied from conduct, the acts, conduct or circumstances relied upon to show
waiver must make out a clear case." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 290 at 706 (2008).
As the Utah Supreme Court stated and emphasized in Soter's, the "totality of
circumstances" must indicate and establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a distinct
intention by a person to relinquish a legal right that the person knows he has. Soter's, 942.
Watkins' conduct, in cashing Henry Day's check (based on the letter he received)
and otherwise, does not prove his distinct intention to waive a right known to him.
Watkins' act of cashing Henry Day's check establishes only his belief and assumption
that Henry Day was being forthright and accurate when it informed him that Ford Motor
Co. would not be allocating to Henry Day the vehicle/model which Henry Day had
contracted to sell to him. The Court of Appeals therefore did not err in concluding that the
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evidence, as marshaled on appeal, did not support the trial court's conclusion that
Watkins had waived or abandoned his rights under his Contracts.
4. Henry Day Ford may not claim that Watkins waived his contract rights
where its false representation was the foundation for Watkins' alleged waiver.
By way of a footnote, the Court of Appeals stated and concluded as follows:
The trial court made a finding that Henry Day "returned
[Watkins]'s check in good faith and based upon the
reasonable belief they would not be allotted any Ford GT
40's." But whether Henry Day was acting in good faith by
making an educated guess is irrelevant - it does not change
the information actually given to Watkins, which information
tells us whether Watkins was relinquishing a known right.
Further, notwithstanding any good faith, the unequivocal
statement from Henry Day was simply incorrect. See
generally 31 CJ.S. Estoppel & Waiver § 218 (2008). ("A
waiver may not be claimed by one whose false representation
is the foundation of the waiver." Henry Day knew that there
existed some possibility, no matter how slim, that Henry Day
would get one of the subject cars").
Watkins, 1J19 n.7. Despite its knowledge, Henry Day told Watkins it would not be getting
any of the subject cars.
"A waiver may not be claimed by one whose false representation is the foundation
of the waiver." 31 CJ.S. Estoppel & Waiver. §218 (2008); see also, Home Ins. Co. v.
Thunderbird Inc., 338 So.2d 391 (Miss. 1976). Henry Day does not, on certiorari,
challenge the Court of Appeals' statement of the law on this issue, nor its application in
this case.
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5. Henry Day Ford did not at trial prove that it was prejudiced by Watkins'
demand in June 2005 that it sell to him the two Ford GTs it had been allocated.
In cases where contractual obligations are involved, the Utah Supreme Court has
added to the elements that it held, in Soter's, must be proven to establish waiver. Thus,
"waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party to the contract intentionally acts in a
manner inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the
opposing party or parties to the contract." Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four,
Inc.. 2009 UT 43, T[17, 216 P.3d 352 (emphasis added); Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, p i ,
71 P.3d 589. Henry Day disclosed to the trial court this additional element. R. 568.
Henry Day, though, did not at trial prove that it was prejudiced by Watkins' supposed
"waiver" of his contractual rights. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions
of law that address the issue of prejudice attributable to conduct by Watkins that is
alleged to have been inconsistent with his contractual rights. Watkins on appeal raised
the issue of prejudice, Appellant's Brief at 42-43, but the Court of Appeals did not
address it.
The requirement that a person who claims that another has waived his contractual
rights must prove prejudice, coincides with the legal principle that "a waiver can be
retracted at any time before the other party has materially changed position in reliance on
the waiver." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §200 at 605 (2000); see also Max 327,
Inc. v. City of Portland, 115 Or. App. 342, 838 P.2d 631, 633 (1992), review denied, 846
P.2d 1161 (Or. 1993). At least in the case of the white 2005 Ford GT Coupe, Henry Day
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cannot maintain it was prejudiced by Watkins' demand that it sell him the vehicle for
MSRP, as Henry Day's owner retained the vehicle for his personal use. As the second
GT was not delivered to Henry Day until July, 2005, or sometime thereafter, Watkins'
demand in early June, 2005 that Henry Day sell to him the second GT (which would
amount to a repudiation of his alleged waiver), was made prior to Henry Day incurring
any prejudice in reliance on the earlier "waiver" of rights that it presumed.
6. Henry Day Ford has waived its right to argue Mutual Abandonment of
the Contracts.
For the first time in this case, Henry Day argues the defense of "mutual
abandonment." Petitioner's Brief at 16-18. Specifically, Henry Day argues that "the
parties' actions of mutual abandonment of the Contracts in this case amount to a
manifestation of mutual assent to rescind the contracts." Id at 17. The Supreme Court
in Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 1980), did state that, "when the intent to
abandon by one party is coupled with the equal intention of the other party, such mutual
abandonment may under certain circumstances, be found to constitute rescission of the
contract." The Supreme Court in Forsyth, however, declined to address the claim of
"mutual abandonment" and rescission of contract because its "review of the pleadings and
record [in Forsyth] discloses no claim of rescission and accordingly the Court refrains
from commenting further with reference to this case." Id. Similarly, Henry Day's
Answer does not plead "mutual abandonment" or rescission of contracts as an affirmative
defense. Therefore, Henry Day has waived this defense. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). Henry
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Day, furthermore, has not previously argued mutual abandonment/rescission as a separate
defense.
C.

The Court of Appeals did not err in Holding that Henry Day Ford
Breached its Contracts with Watkins.

Henry Day did not, in its petition for writ of certiorari, ask the Supreme Court to
review this issue. The holding that Henry Day breached the Contracts, though, is the
logical consequence of its holdings on contract interpretation and waiver/abandonment.
Henry Day's argument on "reasonable time to perform," though, is a new argument not
before raised, which goes beyond the issues that Henry Day asked the Supreme Court to
review. It also ignores that the parties' agreement was tied to a condition precedent. Its
argument on "meeting of the minds" is also a new argument not before raised.
D. The Court of Appeals did not err in its Ruling on Mitigation of Damages.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence before it was insufficient for it to
determine if Watkins failed to mitigate his damages, and determine that this defense could
be reconsidered by the trial court on remand. Indeed, the trial court did not reach the
question of damages.
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 39, that Watkins failed to mitigate his
damages, amounts to a conclusion of law which should be accorded no deference by a
court of appeal. The factual basis of the argument is that Watkins declined a postcomplaint offer by Henry Day to sell to Watkins the third GT it received for MSRP. The
offer was made after the market value of GTs had dropped significantly.
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In Mallek v. City of San Benito. 121 F.3d 993 ( 5th Cir. 1997), the city based its
motion for summary judgment, in part, on plaintiffs alleged failure to mitigate his
damages by refusing to accept the City's offer of employment. In rejecting this argument,
the 5th Circuit held that a duty to mitigate damages "does not include the duty to accept a
new and different bargain with terms less favorable than those to which [a party] had
previously agreed." Id., 997. Watkins, after this lawsuit was filed, was not required to
abandon his remedy for damages measured at the time of Henry Day's breach and accept
Henry Day's belated offer to sell him a Ford GT at MSRP on penalty that his rejection of
the offer would be deemed a failure to mitigate his damages.
E. The Court of Appeals did not Err in Awarding Watkins his Attorneys
Fees on Appeal.
Attorneys fees in this matter is a function of who prevails on the breach of contract
claim, as the Contracts include an attorneys fee provision. If Henry Day breached the
contracts, then Watkins is entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys fees, including his
reasonable attorneys fees incurred on appeal. If the Supreme Court affirms the Court of
Appeals' Decision, then Henry Day is obviously not entitled to recover its attorneys fees
and costs on appeal. If the Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and reinstates
the judgment of the trial court, then Henry Day Ford should be entitled to recover its
reasonable attorneys fees incurred on appeal.
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VIII. REQUESTED RELIEF
Tom Watkins requests that the Supreme Court affirm the Decision by the Court of
Appeals in its entirety.
DATED this

CO
(O ""day of June, 2011.

By_^/
P. Bryan Fishburn
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF was mailed in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on the y- day
of June, 2011, to the following:
Robert W. Hughes, Esq.
438 E. 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Petitioner, Henry Day Ford

P. Bryan fishburn
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DEAR SIR,
ENCLOSED PLEASE FIND A CHECK FOR THE REFUND OF DEPOSIT ON
YOUR VEHICLE ORDER. WE REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT OUR
ALLOCATION IS NOT GOING TO ALLOW US TO RECEIVE THIS VEHICLE.
ME APOLOGIZE FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE THIS HAS CAUSED YOU.
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[ENRY DAY FORD, INC.
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Addendum B

« B A C K TD FEATURED AFTTICUSS

FEATURE ARTICLES
From Concept to Production: GT40 to Ford GT

NOTIFY hAB W H E N E m
UPDATED:

jEnter email address

Jun03
Designing a GT40 concept car t o
celebrate Ford's centennial was a
great idea. But even gutsier was
the decision to the take the giant
step and design the street-legal
Ford GT.

[June 2003] The Ford GT40 concept car, unveiled to universal acclaim at the
2002 North American International Auto Show, was part of a Living Legends
line of concept and production cars that included such venerable marques as
Thunderbird, Mustang, and the Forth-Nine concept.
"GT40 is the ultimate Living Legend," said 3 Mays, Ford vice president of
Design. "It's a true supercar with appeal equal to that of the greatest sports
cars in the world, but with the addition of a heritage no cne can match.
Essential elements of the original, including the stunning low profile and midmounted American V8, continue in this latest interpretation of the classic."

The GT40 concent bears a resemblance to the low, sleek silhouette of the
original but nothing more. In every dimension, every curve and nut and bolt,
it's a purely modern interpretation.
For those unfamiliar with the story, the Ford GT40 dethroned Italian
automaker Ferrari at the 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans, the most prestigious of
all international racing events. Until then, Ferrari had pretty much owned Le
Mans, having won the title the six previous years. Ford went on to win again
in 1967, this time by the Shelby-American team in a GT40 Mark IV driven by
Americans AJ. Foyt and Dan Gurney. A Ford GT40 won again in 1968 and
1969.
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Ford's domination at Le Mans over those glory years in the 1960s is itself a
fascinating chapter in the history of international endurance racing. But
perhaps even more interesting is that Ford accomplished this amazing feat in
just over a few short years of planning and development.
If you want to achieve something badly enough, you go for it with everything
you've got. That's what Ford Chairman Henry Ford I I did with his "Total
Performance" campaign. The whole GT40 story, the determination to
surmount overwhelming odds and become the best, can be summer •>:•
Single rour-ie'crer word - QUCSI
It's easy to understand why the Ford GT was chosen to represent the pride of
the Ford Motor Company in its 100th year of putting the world on wheels.
"The GT40 concent should do three things go fast handle exceptionally and
look great," said Chris Theodore, then Ford's vice president of North America
Product Development. "To be true to its Ford heritage, we had to create a
supercar that would be uniquely a Ford. Anyone can do technology
showpieces, high-displacement engines and modernistic designs, but there's
much more to a GT40. There's heritage and heart. We think this car remains
true to the spirit of its predecessors/'
The Ford GT40 concept was a beautiful design, but how about an actual
production model? Tnat would be even grander. So thought Ford CEO William
Clay Ford, Jr. when he heard wave after enthusiastic wave of thunderous
approval at the 2002 North American International Auto Show. And so it
would be.
Miraculously, the job of bringing the GT40 from concept car to production
would have to be accomplished in just 16 months,, in time for the centennial
celebration in June 2003=
Johi i Coletti, director of S'VT Programs, assembled a Dream Team of designers
and engineers to take the brainchild of J Mays and Chris Theodore and make
it street legal. Making extensive use of computer models, they accomplished
in about three months time what is usually done in the First nine months, and
relied on 90 percent fewer prototype builds than normal
Equipped with the latest in computer design technology and drawing on
limitless reserves of enthi isiasm, the Ford GT team made the impossible
possible.
If oi ily Henry I I could have been here to watch the For d GT parade
commemorating the lOOtl t Anniversary of the company, he'd have been
mighty proud indeed.
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